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Abstract
This paper explores global dynamics in a monetary model with limited asset
market participation and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. It is
shown that a rise in government transfers to ‘non-Ricardian’ consumers financed
by debt-based taxes to ‘Ricardian’ consumers is capable of escaping disinflationary
paths typically convergent to a liquidity trap. Fiscal policy does not need to be
unsustainable at the low inflation steady state to avoid liquidity traps, as argued in
the context of the standard single representative agent setup.
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1 Introduction
We explore the dynamic effects of budgetary policies in a monetary model with limited
asset market participation. Multiplicity of steady state equilibria, due to the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates, affects global dynamics. We demonstrate that a rise
in government transfers to ‘non-Ricardian’ consumers, financed by debt-based taxes to
‘Ricardian’ consumers, is capable of escaping disinflationary paths typically convergent
to a liquidity trap. This result radically differs from what is commonly argued in the
context of the single representative agent paradigm, i.e., that fiscal policy needs to be
unsustainable at the low inflation steady state to rule out the liquidity trap equilibrium
(Benhabib et al., 2002; Woodford, 2003). In a setting with heterogeneous consumers, by
contrast, we show that intertemporally balanced fiscal expansions—globally satisfying the
Ricardian agents’ transversality condition—do suffice to avoid liquidity traps.
The present paper is connected to both empirical and theoretical literature. Em-
pirically, the share of non-Ricardian agents—intended as non-optimizing individuals who
employ the ‘rule-of-thumb’ of consuming their current disposable income, without smooth-
ing consumption overtime by recourse to financial markets—range from 26 to 40 percent
in industrialized countries (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Coenen and Straub, 2005; Forni
et al., 2009; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2011; Albonico et al., 2014). A systematic incorpora-
tion of non-Ricardian households within macroeconomic models for policy evaluation is
therefore often advocated, at least since the seminal paper by Mankiw (2000).
Indeed, research in macroeconomics increasingly employs frameworks whereby non-
Ricardian agents coexist with Ricardian agents, in order to examine the effects and the
design of both monetary policy (Gal´ı et al., 2004; Di Bartolomeo and Rossi, 2007; Bilbiie,
2008; Colciago, 2011; Ascari et al., 2017) and fiscal policy (Gal´ı et al., 2007), as well as the
issue of monetary-fiscal interrelationships (Motta and Tirelli, 2012, 2015; Rossi, 2014).1
1An alternative strand of literature departing from Ricardian equivalence studies monetary-fiscal policy
interactions in the presence of distortionary taxation. See, for example, Correia et al. (2013), who examine
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Consistently with the business cycle literature, nevertheless, the foregoing ‘New Key-
nesian’ studies by construction rely on local dynamics, hence abstracting from global
nonlinearities.2 Our central focus, on the other hand, is to depart from local analysis,
and concentrate on global nonlinear dynamics and possible multiplicities of steady-state
equilibria.
In the traditional infinite-horizon representative agent setup, Benhabib et al. (2002)
show that, once global dynamics are taken into account, interest rate rules locally ensuring
inflation control typically give rise to multiple self-fulfilling decelerating inflation paths
converging to a liquidity trap equilibrium. They demonstrate that avoiding liquidity traps
requires ‘making the low-inflation steady state fiscally unsustainable’, that is, violating the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government and thus the transversality condition
should the economy embark on decelerating inflation trajectories. Our main contribution,
on the other hand, is to show that sustainable fiscal expansions, respecting the govern-
ment’s intertemporal budget constraint for any inflation path, may well escape liquidity
traps when the economy is populated by both Ricardian and non-Ricardian individuals,
as widely documented by the empirical evidence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 investigates
the interaction between inflation and public deficits dynamics from a global perspective.
Section 4 summarizes the conclusions.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of infinitely lived households [0, 1]. A 1 − λ share consists of
‘Ricardian’ households, who are forward looking and smooth consumption by having
access to financial markets. The remaining λ share consists of ‘non-Ricardian’ households
the issue of optimal unconventional fiscal policy at the zero lower bound, following a temporary discount
factor shock.
2See Cochrane (2011, 2016) for a critique to the standard local determinacy results emphasized in the
New Keynesian literature under the conventional Taylor-rule-framework.
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a` la Mankiw (2000), who cannot accumulate any assets nor have any liabilities, hence
fully consuming their current labor income net of taxes.
Subscript R denotes the Ricardian representative agent, whose lifetime utility function
is given by ∫
∞
0
e−ρt log Ω(cR (t) , mR (t))dt, (1)
where ρ > 0 indicates the rate of time preference, cR (t) consumption, and mR (t) real
money balances at instant of time t. Function Ω (· , ·) is strictly increasing, strictly con-
cave and linearly homogeneous. Consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth
complements (Reis, 2007), Ωcm > 0, and the elasticity of substitution between the two is
lower than unity (Cushing, 1999). The flow budget constraint is
a˙R (t) = (i (t)− pi (t)) aR (t) + yR (t)− τR (t)− cR (t)− i (t)mR (t) , (2)
where aR (t) denotes real financial wealth, consisting of interest-bearing government bonds
and money balances, yR (t) an endowment of perishable goods, τR (t) real lump-sum taxes
net of public transfers, i (t) the nominal interest rate on bonds, and pi (t) = P˙ (t) /P (t)
the inflation rate. Ponzi’s games are precluded, implying
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
[i(j)−pi(j)]djaR (t) ≥ 0. (3)
Letting zR(t) denote total consumption, defined as physical consumption plus the interest
forgone on real money holdings,
zR(t) = cR (t) + i (t)mR (t) , (4)
the optimizing problem can be solved using a two-stage procedure (Marini and van der
Ploeg, 1988). In the first stage, consumers solve an intratemporal problem of choosing
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the efficient allocation between consumption and real money balances to maximize func-
tion Ω (· , ·), for a given level of total consumption, zR(t). Optimality implies that the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real balances equals the nomi-
nal interest rate, Ωm (cR (t) , mR (t)) / Ωc (cR (t) , mR (t)) = i(t). Because preferences are
linearly homogeneous, this optimality condition is of form
cR (t) = Γ(i(t))mR (t) , (5)
where Γ′ (·) > 0. In the second stage, Ricardian households solve an intertemporal prob-
lem of choosing the optimal time path of total consumption, zR(t), to maximize the
lifetime utility function (1), given (5) and the constraints (2) and (3). Using (4) and (5)
yields log Ω(cR (t) , mR (t)) = log q(t) + log zR(t), where q(t) = Ω
(
Γ(i(t))
Γ(i(t))+i(t)
, 1
Γ(i(t))+i(t)
)
.
Consequently, at the optimum
z˙R(t) = (i(t)− pi(t)− ρ)zR(t), (6)
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
[i(j)−pi(j)]djaR (t) = 0. (7)
From (5),
zR(t) = Θ(i(t))cR (t) , (8)
where Θ(i(t)) = 1 + i(t)/Γ (i(t)). Combining (6) and (8) yields the optimal time path of
Ricardian households’ consumption:
c˙R (t) = (i(t)− pi(t)− ρ) cR (t)−
Θ′(i(t))i˙(t)
Θ(i(t))
cR (t) . (9)
where Θ′ (·) > 0.
Households in the [0, λ] interval, denoted by subscript NR, neither save nor borrow,
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thereby behaving in a “hand-to-mouth” fashion, along the lines of Mankiw (2000):3
cNR (t) = yNR (t)− τNR (t) . (10)
As in Gal´ı et al. (2007), taxes paid by non-Ricardian households may differ from those of
Ricardian households.
The government finances deficits by printing money,M , and issuing bonds, B. Assum-
ing that public consumption is zero, for simplicity, the government’s budget constraint in
real terms is thus
a˙ (t) = (i (t)− pi (t)) a (t)− λτNR (t)− (1− λ) τR (t)− i (t)m (t) , (11)
where a (t) = (B (t) +M (t)) /P (t) andm (t) =M (t) /P (t). For the argument developed
in this paper, we shall assume that the fiscal policy regime is globally ‘Ricardian’, i.e.,
guarantees that the present discounted value of government liabilities converges to zero
for any path of the endogenous variables:
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
[i(j)−pi(j)]dja (t) = 0. (12)
Following Benhabib et al. (2002), the monetary authority adopts an interest rate
policy described by the feedback rule
i (t) = Φ(pi (t)), (13)
where function Φ (·) is continuous, increasing, positive, and at the target inflation rate,
3Reasons behind such a behavior notably include lack of access to financial markets, binding borrowing
constraints, myopia, extreme hyperbolic discounting, or limited information.
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pi∗, monetary policy obeys the Taylor (1993) principle. Specifically,
∃pi∗ > −ρ : Φ (pi∗) = ρ+ pi∗, Φ′ (pi∗) > 1. (14)
In the aggregate, equilibrium in the goods and the assets markets requires c(t) = y(t),
where
c (t) = λcNR (t) + (1− λ)cR (t) (15)
and y (t) = λyNR (t) + (1 − λ)yR (t), a (t) = (1 − λ)aR (t), and m (t) = (1 − λ)mR (t).
Assuming constant endowments, consistently with Benhabib et al. (2002), equations (9),
(10), (13) and (15) yield
p˙it = H(pi (t))
[
(Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)− ρ)− λ
τ˙NR (t)
y − λ (yNR − τNR (t))
]
, (16)
where y − λ (yNR − τNR (t)) > 0 and
H(pi (t)) =
Θ(Φ(pi (t)))
Φ′(pi (t))Θ′(Φ(pi (t)))
> 0. (17)
3 Fiscal Policy and Inflation Dynamics
According to (16), in the present framework inflation dynamics not only depend on real
interest rates but also on the time profile of taxes (net of transfers). Only in the limiting
case in which λ = 0, Ricardian equivalence holds and inflation dynamics evolve consis-
tently with the single infinitely lived representative agent paradigm. In this polar case,
p˙it = H(pi (t)) (Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)− ρ), and the results obtained by Benhabib et al. (2002)
apply. Specifically, if fiscal policy is globally Ricardian, the presence of a zero bound on
nominal interest rates combined with an interest rate rule increasing in inflation and such
that Φ′ (pi∗) > 1 must imply the existence of a low, and possibly negative, alternative
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steady-state inflation rate, piL < pi∗, at which monetary policy is ‘passive’, Φ′
(
piL
)
< 1.
Multiple steady-state equilibria occur, and, because H(pi (t)) > 0, global dynamics ex-
hibit self-fulfilling decelerating inflation paths converging to the unintended liquidity trap
steady state piL, as shown in Figure 1.
Nevertheless, in the presence of non-Ricardian households (λ > 0), even if budgetary
policies are expected to always satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint,
inflation dynamics depend on both monetary and fiscal policies.
Can liquidity traps be avoided through sustainable fiscal policies? Consider the case
in which the fiscal authority implements increases in public transfers (or taxes cuts) to
non-Ricardian households financed by debt-based taxes to Ricardian households, should
the economy embark on a self-fulfilling decelerating inflation path. Formally,
λτNR (t) = Ψ (Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)) , (18)
(1− λ) τR (t) + i (t)m (t) = ψ (t) a (t) , (19)
where function Ψ (·) is positive and increasing, and ψ (t) is positive and assumed to obey
ψ (t) > Ψ (Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)) /a (t). Thus, the fiscal stimulus that occurs when the central
bank decreases the real interest rate in the attempt to reverse dynamics is intertemporally
balanced, for it satisfies (12). Using (18), equation (16) becomes
p˙i (t) =
H(pi (t))
K(pi (t))
(Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)− ρ) . (20)
where
K(pi (t)) = 1 +
Ψ′ (Φ(pi (t)− pi (t)) (Φ′(pi (t))− 1)H(pi (t))
y − λyNR +Ψ (Φ(pi (t))− pi (t))
≶ 0. (21)
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Suppose that the fiscal expansion is sufficiently aggressive, such that
Ψ′ (ρ) >
y − λyNR +Ψ (ρ)
(1− Φ′(piL))H(piL)
, (22)
implying K(pi (t)) < (>) 0 for pi (t) < (>) p¯i, where piL < p¯i < pi∗ satisfies K(p¯i) = 0.
The phase diagram associated with equation (20) is shown in Figure 2. Under condition
(22), the fiscal stimulus is capable of escaping the liquidity trap equilibrium, making
the economy converge asymptotically to p¯i > piL. The baseline economic mechanism at
work is as follows. The rise in transfers (or the cut in taxes) to non-Ricardian consumers
stimulates aggregate demand for goods. The increase in aggregate demand occurs without
affecting the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, as Ricardian equivalence
does not apply. The associated excess demand in the goods market induces an increase
in inflation to restore equilibrium, thereby preventing the economy from falling into the
liquidity-trap steady state piL.
Therefore, our analytical results support the view that it is feasible to escape liquidity
traps through expansionary fiscal policies without the ‘threat’ of generating unsustainable
budgetary deficits.
4 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to analyze the scope for avoiding liquidity traps through in-
tertemporally balanced fiscal policies in a monetary model with agents’ heterogeneity,
due to limited asset market participation. The main result is that an increase in govern-
ment transfers to ‘non-Ricardian’ consumers, financed by debt-based taxes to ‘Ricardian’
consumers, succeeds in offsetting self-fulfilling disinflationary paths per se converging to a
low inflation—possibly deflation—liquidity trap steady state. Expansionary government
budgetary policies do not need to violate the transversality condition to rule out liquidity
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traps, as it emerges within the single infinitely lived representative agent framework.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram of pi (t) under the single infinitely lived representative agent
limiting case, equations (16)-(17) with λ = 0
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of pi (t) with Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers, equations
(20)-(22) with λ > 0
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